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France’s	  action	  against	  maritime	  piracy	  	  
and	  	  
the	  Contact	  Group	  on	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  (CGPCS)	  :	  	  
interests,	  interactions	  and	  priorities.	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Abstract	  
France	   is	  an	  active	  participant	   in	  the	  Contact	  Group	  and	   in	   its	  working	  groups.	  Since	  2009,	   the	  
French	  state	  attempts	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia,	  arguing	  the	  destabilization	  
of	   Somalia	   directly	   threatens	   the	   European	   and	   international	   security.	   As	   EU	   member	   state,	  
France	  calls	  for	  responsibility	  and	  respect	  of	  international	  legal	  norms.	  Within	  the	  framework	  of	  
the	   Common	   Security	   and	   Defence	   Policy,	   France	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   promoting	   notably	   the	  
coordination	  between	  civilian	  and	  military	  actors	  of	  the	  maritime	  surveillance.	  
This	  paper	  addresses	  issues	  about	  the	  contribution	  of	  France	  within	  the	  different	  CGPCS	  working	  
groups:	   attendance,	   discussions	   or	   even	   necessary	   impetus	   protecting	   various	   international,	  
European	   and	   national	   interests.	   The	   role	   of	   France	   has	   to	   be	   appreciated	   regarding	   the	   EU	  
presidency	   of	   the	   Contact	   Group.	   The	   interaction	   between	   the	   work	   of	   the	   CGPCS	   and	   other	  
mechanisms,	  as	   for	   example	   the	  SHADE,	   INTERPOL,	   the	   Indian	  Ocean	  Commission	  or	   the	  Trust	  
fund	   to	   support	   the	   initiatives	   of	   States	   countering	   piracy	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia,	   must	   be	  
considered	  as	  well.
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 Introduction 	  2The	   very	   concept	   of	   piracy	   has	   evolved	   over	   the	   years.	   From	  Homer’s	   epic	   poems 	  until	   its	  3codiZication	  in	  the	  20th	  century ,	  the	  deZinition	  of	  acts	  of	  piracy	  has	  always	  been	  inZluenced	  by	  4national	   and	   international	   diplomacy	   and	   economics.	   Even	   though	   pirates	   are	   generally	  described	   as	  hostis	   humanis	   generis,	   there	  has	  been	   a	   time	  when	  piracy	  was	  not	   a	   crime	  as	  such,	  when	  lawful	  and	  unlawful	  pirates	  did	  effectively	  coexist .	  	  5Nowadays,	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  competent	   international	  organisations	  and	  its	  resurgence	   in	  the	   70's,	   piracy	   became	   a	   major	   security	   issue.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   legal	  international	   standards	   can	   only	   emerge	   when	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   large	   number	   of	   States	  coincide .	  Piracy	  constitutes	  a	  perfect	  exemple,	  especially	  while	  the	  United	  Nations	  worked	  on	  6the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  from	  1973	  to	  1982 .	  7Acts	  of	  piracy	  are	  now	  deZined	  by	  art.	  101	  of	  the	  1982	  Montego	  Bay	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	   Sea	   (UNCLOS).	   They	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   universal	   competence	   for	   the	   States.	   A	   State	   which	  carried	   out	   the	   seizure	   and	   persons	   having	   taken	   control	   of	   the	   ship	  may	   decide	   upon	   the	  penalties	  to	  be	  imposed	  (UNCLOS,	  art.	  105	  to	  107).	  Such	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  should	  lead	  to	  an	  effective	   Zight	   against	   piracy.	   Nevertheless,	   its	   enforcement	   takes	   place	   on	   an	   expressly	  voluntary	  basis	  of	  the	  States.	  Its	  effective	  application	  depends	  thus	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  places	  of	  discussions,	  negotiations,	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  of	  national	  strategies	  and	  means	  of	  action.	  Many	   national	   naval	   actions	   have	   been	   taken	   place	   over	   the	   past	   decade,	   to	   protect	   and	  prevent	  acts	  of	  piracy	  against	  merchant	  ships	  transiting	  through	  waters	  off	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  Different	   instruments	  are	  now	  playing	  a	  key	   role	   in	  deterring	  acts	  of	  piracy.	  The	  number	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  naval	  forces	  and	  initiatives	  demonstrates	  the	  great	  importance	  attached	  by	  both	  States	  and	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Agencies	  to	  the	  containment	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  :	  the	  action	  of	   national	   navies,	   the	  European	  union	   (EU)	  operation	  Atalanta,	   the	  US	  CTF-­‐151,	   the	  creation	   of	   the	   Shared	  Awareness	   and	  DeconZliction	   (SHADE)	   but	   also	   the	  work	   of	   the	   IMB	  
	  The	  views	  expressed	  in	  this	  paper	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reZlect	  the	  views	  or	  policy	  of	  the	  interviewed	  experts.	  We	  2express	  our	  gratitude	  in	  particular	  to	  Her	  Excellency	  Ambassador	  Véronique	  Roger-­‐Lacan,	  Special	  Representative	  for	  the	  Fight	  against	  Maritime	  Piracy,	  Mrs	  Lisa	  Plesse	  and	  Mrs.	  Louise	  Cadin,	  French	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  for	  their	  comments,	  support	  and	  time.	  Power	   J.,	  Maritime	  Terrorism:	  A	  New	  Challenge	   for	  National	  and	   International	   Security,	  10	  Barry	  Law	  Review,	  32008,	  112	  Tuerk	  H.	  ReRlections	  on	  The	  Contemporary	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Leiden-­‐Boston,	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2012,	  724	  Gaurier	  D.,	  «	  The	  Pirate’s	  Path:	  Becoming	  the	  Enemy	  of	  All	  Mankind	  »,	   in	  Norchi	  Ch.	  H.,	  Proutière-­‐Maulion	  G.,	  5
Piracy	  in	  comparative	  perspectives	  :	  Problems,	  Strategies,	  Law,	  Paris-­‐Londres,	  Pedone-­‐Hart,	  2012,	  25-­‐40	  Ladreit	  de	  Lacharrrière	  G.,	  La	  politique	  juridique	  extérieure,	  Paris,	  IFRI,	  1983,	  286	  p.6	  Houry	  C.,	  La	  piraterie	  maritime	  au	  regard	  du	  droit	  international.	  Incertitudes	  et	  évolutions	  contemporaines,	  Paris,	  7L’Harmattan,	  2014,	  260	  p. Page	    	  sur	   2 10
 Piracy	  Reporting	   Centre,	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Internationally	  Recommended	  Transit	   Corridor	  (IRTC),	  the	  Best	  Management	  Practices	  (BMPs),	  the	  Djibouti	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  etc …	  The	  most	  8prominent	   feature	   of	   the	   Zight	   against	   piracy,	   as	   it	   is	   conducted	   today,	   appears	   to	   be	   the	  operational	   capacity	   of	   the	   concerned	   and	   involved	   States,	   inter-­‐governmental	   and	  international	  organisations.	  	  The	  Contact	  Group	  on	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  (CGPCS)	  could	  be	  seen	  only	  as	  a	  forum	  of	  discussions	   among	   others,	   facilitating	   the	   coordination	   of	   counter-­‐piracy	   activities	   in	   the	  region.	  Nevertheless,	  its	  independence	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  :	  «	  one	  positive	  feature	  of	  the	  CGPCS	  is	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  UN	  contact	  group,	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  act	  independently	  «	  and	  do	  things	  that	  a	  UN	  
contact	  group	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  do	  in	  terms	  of	  bureaucracy	  and	  procedure	  »	  » .	  The	  Contact	  9Group	   is	   indeed	   part	   of	   an	   international	   political	   process	   on	   maritime	   piracy,	   presenting	  particular	  characteristics.	  The	  Zight	  against	  piracy	  includes	  a	  set	  of	  political	  wills	  and	  operational	  measures	  dedicated	  to	  the	   protection	   of	   national,	   international,	   economic	   and	   security	   interests.	   France’s	   external	  action	   falls	   within	   different	   frameworks,	   discussed	   in	   political	   and	   diplomatic	   forums,	  including	   the	   CGPCS.	   Hence,	   France’s	   contribution	   to	   the	   Contact	   Group	   can	   only	   be	  appreciated	  with	  regard	  to	  other	  national	  initiatives,	  consistent	  with	  the	  EU	  Common	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy.	  
France	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  CGPCS	  
The	  contemporary	  counter-­‐piracy	  mechanisms	  originally	  emerged	  at	  a	  state	  level.	  Coping	  with	  an	   alarming	   resurgence	   of	   acts	   of	   piracy	   in	   2007,	   France	   was	   one	   of	   the	   Zirst	   states	   that	  volunteered	  to	  provide	  military	  ships	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  World	  Food	  Program	  (WFP)	  in	   Somalia.	   To	   this	   end,	   operation	   ALCYON	   was	   launched,	   to	   accompany	   the	   vulnerable	  humanitarian	   ships.	   This	   operation	   is	   conducted	   primarily	   by	   France,	   and	   then	   relayed	   by	  Denmark,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Canada.	  	  Considering	   the	   positive	   results	   of	   the	   French	   operation,	   the	   Security	   Council	   of	   the	  United	  Nations	  (UNSC)	  adopted	  Resolution	  1814	  (2008)	  about	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia,	  reiterating	  its	  support	   for	   the	   contribution	   made	   by	   some	   States	   to	   protect	   the	   WFP	   maritime	   convoys.	  Subsequently,	  a	  series	  of	  Resolutions	  authorized	  operations	  within	  Somalia’s	  territorial	  waters	  
	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  mechanisms	  :	  Kraska	  J.,	  Contemporary	  Maritime	  Piracy,	  Santa	  Barbara,	  Praeger,	  8253	  p.	  Zach	  D.	  A.,	  Conor	  Seyle	  D.,	  Vestergaard	  Madsen	  J.,	  Burden-­‐sharing	  Multi-­‐level	  governance	  :	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Contact	  9
Group	   on	   Piracy	   Off	   the	   Coast	   of	   Somalia,	   One	   Earth	   Future	   and	   Oceans	   Beyond	   Piracy	   Report,	   2013,	   56	   p.,	  (Footnote	   151	   :	   Interview	  with	   James	  Hughes,	   February	   22,	   2013),	   [online]	   :	   http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/1earthfuture.org/Ziles/documents/publications/BurdenSharingMulti-­‐levelGovern_Zinal.pdf	  Page	    	  sur	   3 10
 or	  even	  on	  its	  soil .	  These	  latter	  encouraged	  and	  permitted	  the	  EU	  to	  establish	  a	  coordination	  10unit	   in	   charge	   of	   supporting	   the	   surveillance	   and	   protection	   activities	   carried	   out	   by	   some	  Member	   States	   off	   the	   Somali	   coast	   (EU	   NAVCO),	   and	   then	   to	   launch	   operation	   ATALANTA	  initially	  dedicated	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  WFP	  vessels .	  11Pursuant	   to	   UN	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   1851	   (2008),	   the	   CGPCS	   was	   established	   on	  January	   14,	   2009	   to	   facilitate	   the	   discussion	   and	   coordination	   of	   actions	   among	   states	   and	  organizations	  to	  suppress	  piracy	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  The	  statements	  of	   	  Resolution	  1851	  (2008)	   allow	   to	   assess	   the	   context	   of	   its	   creation.	   India	   initially	   approved	   and	   supported	  creation	  of	  the	  group ,	  mentioning	  the	  necessity	  «	  to	  institutionalize	  operational	  coordination	  12
among	  navies	  in	  the	  area,	  and	  to	  set	  up	  a	  mechanism,	  such	  as	  a	  contact	  group,	  for	  those	  involved	  
in	   the	  anti-­‐piracy	  effort	   » .	   Such	  an	  outlook	  was	  not	  universally	   shared.	  For	   its	  part,	  France	  13supported	  «	  a	  phased	  United	  Nations	  involvement	  [that]	  could	  be	  deployed	  that	  Rirst	  focused	  on	  
political	   progress	   »	   and	   described	   at	   Zirst	   the	   efforts	   made	   towards	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  coordination	  mechanism,	  without	  speciZically	  mentioning	  the	  Contact	  Group .	  14As	  any	  Contact	  Group,	  the	  CGPCS	  aims	  at	  promoting	  discussions	  at	  a	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  level	   to	   resolve	  a	  crisis.	  France	  supports	   this	  primary	   task	   that	   contributes	  not	  only	   to	   Zight	  maritime	   piracy	   but	   also	   to	   rebuild	   an	   effective	   Somali	   State.	   This	   needs	   «	   a	   clear	   political	  
strategy.	   	  After	  a	  20-­‐year	  vacuum	  of	  political	  power,	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  new	  institutions	  that	  
represented	  the	  country	  » .	  The	  French	  contribution 	  to	  the	  Trust	  Fund	  to	  Support	  Initiatives	  15 16of	  States	  Countering	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia 	  demonstrates	  a	  strong	  will	  to	  encourage	  17a	  jurisdictional	  response	  to	  the	  offshore	  phenomenon	  and	  its	  onshore	  origins.	  
	   Guilfoyle	   D.,	   «	   Counter-­‐Piracy	   Law	   Enforcement	   and	   Human	   Rights	   »,	   International	   and	   Comparative	   Law	  10
Quarterly,	  vol.	  59,	  Issue	  1,	  January	  2010,	  pp.	  141-­‐169	   Leboeuf	   C.,	   «	   Operation	   ATALANTA	   »,	   in	   Norchi	   Ch.	   H.,	   Proutière-­‐Maulion	   G.,	   Piracy	   in	   comparative	  11
perspectives…	  op.	  cit.,	  pp.	  225-­‐248	  Kraska	  J.,	  Contemporary	  Maritime	  Piracy,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  16012	  UN	  Doc.	  SC/9541,	  6046th	  meeting,	  December	  16,	  200813	  Ibid.14	  UN	  Doc.	  SC/10792,	  6848th	  meeting,	  October	  16,	  2012	  ;	  See	  also,	  UN	  Doc.	  SC/10648,	  6770th	  meeting,	  May	  15,	  152012	  Details	  available	  at	  :	  http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/APF00	  16	  Trust	  Fund	  Terms	  of	  reference,	  approved	  by	  the	  13th	  plenary	  of	  the	  CGPCS	  on	  11	  December	  2012,	  4-­‐5	  :	   	  «	  The	  17
overall	  purpose	  of	  the	  Trust	  Fund	  is	  to	  help	  defray	  the	  expenses	  associated	  with	  prosecution	  of	  suspected	  pirates,	  as	  
well	  as	  other	  activities	  related	  to	  implementing	  the	  Contact	  Group’s	  objectives	  regarding	  combating	  piracy	  in	  all	  its	  
aspects.	   […]	   SpeciRically,	   the	   Trust	   Fund	   shall:	   expand	   the	   current	   possibilities	   available	   to	   both	   States	   and	   the	  
private	   sector	   to	  make	   tangible	   contributions	   to	   combat	   piracy	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia;	   permit	   the	   payment	   of	  
expenses	   associated	   with	   prosecution	   and	   detention	   of	   suspected	   pirates	   as	   soon	   as	   possible;	   provide	   for	   an	  
expedited	   distribution	  mechanism	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   payment	   or	   reimbursement	   of	   short-­‐term	   prosecution	   related	  
expenses;	  and	  support	  relevant	  legal	  capacity-­‐building	  activities	  ».	  Page	    	  sur	   4 10
 As	  an	   international,	  ad	  hoc	  political	   forum,	   the	  CGPCS	  has	  a	   certain	   interest	   to	   somalize	   the	  solutions .	   Given	   the	   existing	   instruments	   dedicated	   to	   operational	   cooperation	   and	  18coordination	   of	   national	   naval	   means,	   it	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   supplementary	   level	   of	  decision.	  
The	   need	   for	   international	   and	   regional	   coordination	   of	   naval	   operations.	   Questioning	  
the	  CGPCS’	  added	  value.	  
Many	   naval	   actions	   are	   conducted	   in	   order	   to	   Zight	   against	   piracy,	   both	   in	   protective	   and	  preventive	  ways.	  Three	  coalitions	  are	  conducting	  naval	  operations	  (EU,	  NATO,	  United	  States),	  in	  combination	  with	  actions	  of	  numerous	  States.	  This	  association	  of	   forces	  constitutes	  an	  ad	  
hoc	   security	   scheme	   in	   the	   Indian	   Ocean.	   Nevertheless,	   naval	   operations	   of	   States	   remain	  conducted	   solely	   under	   national	   command,	   challenging	   the	   created	   forums’	   legitimacy .	   As	  19mentioned	  before,	  the	  	  coordination	  scheme	  raises	  both	  political	  and	  operational	  issues.	  At	   the	   political	   level,	   France	   participates	   fully	   to	   the	   CGPCS	   debates,	   as	   EU	   member	   and	  contributor	   to	   the	  European	  naval	   forces	   (EUNAVFOR-­‐ATALANTA).	   In	   2012,	  we	  noted	   some	  difZiculties	   raising	   from	   the	   political	   cooperation	   of	   the	   naval	   actions ,	   notably	   within	   the	  20Shared	   Awareness	   and	   Deconﬂiction	   (SHADE) .	   The	   CGPCS	   might	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  21complementary	   solution	   to	   overstep	   political	   issues.	   The	   CGPCS	   different	  meetings	   and	   the	  current	  studies	  about	   the	   future	  of	   the	   Zive	  working	  groups	  demonstrate	  a	   truly	  prospective	  and	  political	  reZlection	  on	  a	  regional	  undertaking	  of	  the	  Zight	  against	  piracy.	  	  An	   increased	   participation	   of	   the	   coastal	   states	   and	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   their	   police	  capacities	   represent	   one	   of	   the	   major	   recurring	   objectives.	   Since	   2010,	   France	   is	   actively	  engaged	   in	   this	   process,	   notably	   through	   the	   project	   MARSIC,	   directed	   by	   France	   Expertise	  
Internationale	  (European	  Commission	  Zinancial	  support).	  This	  project	  supports	  the	  set	  up	  of	  a	  Regional	  Training	  Centre	  in	  Djibouti	  and	  of	  Information	  Sharing	  Centres	  in	  Mombasa,	  Dar-­‐es-­‐Salam	   et	   Sanaa.	   These	   different	   centres	   are	   part	   of	   the	   21	   regional	   States	   ongoing	  commitments	  embedded	  in	  the	  Djibouti	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  (January	  2009).	  France	  supports	  the	  implementation	   of	   this	   Code	   that	   constitutes	   an	   effective	   tool	   to	   promote	   initiatives	   in	   the	  Indian	   ocean.	   The	   European	   Union	   Mission	   on	   Regional	   Maritime	   Capacity-­‐Building	   in	   the	  
	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Adviser	   to	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   on	   Legal	   Issues	   Related	   to	   Piracy	   off	   the	   Coast	   of	  18Somalia,	  Annex	  to	  the	  letter	  dated	  24	  January	  2011	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  UNSC	  S/2011/30,	  January	  25,	  2011,	  79	  Roger-­‐Lacan	  V.,	  «	  Lutter	  contre	  la	  piraterie,	  facteur	  structurant	  de	  sécurité	  en	  océan	  indien?	  »,	  Hérodote,	  n°	  145,	  192012/2,	  pp.	  118-­‐128	  Leboeuf	  C.,	  «	  Operation	  ATALANTA	  »…,	  op.	  cit.20	  See	  Guilfoyle	  D.,	  Modern	  Piracy:	  Legal	  Challenges	  and	  Responses,	  Cheltenham,	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing,	  2013,	  2153 Page	    	  sur	   5 10
 Horn	   of	   Africa	   (EUCAP	   Nestor),	   launched	   on	   January	   11,	   2013 	   contributes	   also	   to	   a	  22regionalization	  of	   the	  maritime	   security.	  The	  French	  State	   supports	   the	  performance	  of	   this	  mission,	   whose	   actual	   Head,	   Etienne	   de	   Poncins,	   was	   formerly	   Ambassador	   of	   France	   in	  Nairobi.	  
At	   the	   operational	   level,	   most	   of	   the	   coordination	   is	   performed	   through	   existing	   bodies	  expressively	  dedicated	   to	   this	   task.	  The	  CGPCS	  Working	  Group	  1	  was	   initially	  dedicated	   the	  coordination	  of	  naval	  operations	  but	  focused	  later	  on	  capacity	  building.	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  its	  primarily	  mission	  could	  supplement	  or	  even	  challenge	  the	  work	  of	  the	  SHADE,	  since	  this	  body	  is	  designed	  to	  effectively	  promote	  and	  enhance	  information	  sharing	  between	  all	  the	  concerned	  actors.	  Even	  if	  it	  has	  been	  launched	  in	  December	  2008	  by	  the	  Combined	  Maritime	  Forces,	  the	  SHADE	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  be	  a	  joint	  operation	  mechanism.	  The	   French	   State	   appears	   to	   be	   considering	   the	   SHADE	   as	   a	   sufZicient	   coordination	   body,	  where	   military,	   civilian,	   non-­‐governmental	   organisations	   and	   shipping	   representatives	   are	  present.	   Moreover	   the	   SHADE	   offers	   access	   to	   a	   military	   communications	   system	   called	  MERCURY	   (real-­‐time	   sharing	   of	   information	   on	   situation),	   which	   is	   largely	   depoliticized .	  23However,	   the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  SHADE 	  and	  the	  eventual	   loss	  of	  control	  and	  command	  of	  24the	   national	   forces	   constitute	   the	   principal	   arguments	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   supplementary	   body	   of	  tactical	  discussions,	  such	  as	  the	  CGPCS.	  The	  following	  point	  of	  view	  helps	  to	  put	  all	  in	  perspective	  :	  	  
«	   Over	   time,	   WG1	   and	   SHADE	   would	   mutually	   inRluence	   each	   other’s	  
development .	   As	   Hopkins 	   explained,	   SHADE	   «	   became	   the	   center	   of	  25 26
gravity	  for	  naval	  coordination,	  because	  it	  needed	  less	  political	  support	  over	  
time.	   »	   «	   One	   of	   the	   great	   successes	   of	   the	   whole	   contact	   group,	   »	   she	  
	   Political	   and	   Security	   Committee	   Decision,	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	   Contributors	   for	   the	  22European	   Union	   Mission	   on	   Regional	   Maritime	   Capacity-­‐Building	   in	   the	   Horn	   of	   Africa	   (EUCAP	   NESTOR),	  2013/41/CFSP,	  January	  11,	  2013	  ;	  See	  EMA,	  «	  Piraterie	  :	  Formation	  des	  garde-­‐côtes	  djiboutiens	  »,	  May	  7,	  2013,	  [online]	  :	  http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/piraterie-­‐formation-­‐des-­‐garde-­‐cotes-­‐djiboutiens	  	   Bueger	   C . ,	   «CounterPiracy,	   Communit ies	   of	   Pract ice	   and	   New	   Security	   Al ignments» ,	  23Journal	  of	  Regional	  Security,	  Issue	  1,	  2013,	  pp.	  49-­‐62	  Experts	  quoted	  in	  Helly	  D.,	  “Lessons	  from	  ATALANTA	  and	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  policies”,	  	  EU	  Institute	  for	  Security	  24Studies,	  Seminar	  Reports,	  Paris,	  23-­‐24	  March	  2011	  /	  Brussels,	  17	  June	  2011,	  p.	  11	  :	  “we	  make	  sure	  we	  don’t	  raise	  
discussions	  at	  the	  political	  level,	  otherwise	  it	  stops	  to	  talk.	  […]	  there	  is	  the	  “impression	  of	  a	  beauty	  contest	  between	  
the	  EU,	  NATO	  and	  CMF”	  It	   is	  the	  fourth	  time	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU	  simultaneously	  deploy	  forces	   in	  the	  same	  area	  and	  
with	  the	  same	  mandate	  […]	  From	  an	  outsider’s	  point	  of	  view,	  EU-­‐NATO	  competition	  on	  piracy	  has	  grown	  and	  is	  a	  
matter	   of	   concern	   for	   the	   industry.	   The	  EU	  and	  NATO	  also	   compete	   for	  media	   coverage	   and	   visibility	   and	   it	  was	  
underlined	  that	  “while	  success	  is	  not	  shared,	  failure	  is””.	  Authors’	  footnote	  :	  Interview	  with	  Chris	  Holtby,	  January	  28,	  201325	  Donna	  Hopkins,	  US	  counter-­‐piracy	  and	  maritime	  security	  coordinator26 Page	    	  sur	   6 10
 
remarked,	  «	  was	  how	  it	  politically	  supported	  the	  development	  and	  evolution	  
of	  the	  SHADE	  mechanism	  for	  operational	  coordination .	  » 	  27 28Those	   interactions	   have	   to	   be	   recognised	   as	   a	   major	   driver	   of	   overall	   cohesion.	   States	  participate	   to	  political	  discussions,	   regardless	  of	  whether	   they	  are	  members	  of	  a	   joint	  naval	  force,	   thus	   helping	   to	   overstep	   some	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   political	   and	   diplomatic	   issues.	  Interactions	  between	   the	  SHADE	  and	   the	  CGPCS	  are	  basically	  needed	   to	  move	   from	  military	  coordination	  to	  political	  action	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Somalia .	  29
The	  CGPCS	  as	  a	  political	  relay	  for	  promotion	  of	  French	  and	  European	  priorities	  The	   Zirst	  operations	   initiated	  by	  France,	   then	   followed	  by	   the	  ATALANTA	  operation,	   reveal	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  secure	  the	  waters	  off	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  The	  pioneering	  role	  of	  France	  in	   this	   Zield	   has	   shown	   the	   very	   interest	   of	   the	   permanent	   pre-­‐positioning	   of	   the	   French	  military	  means	  in	  this	  particular	  region ,	  where	  the	  risks	  related	  to	  the	  strategic	  interests	  are	  30particularly	   high .	   That	   commitment	   remains	   valid	   ;	   according	   to	   the	   2013	   French	  White	  31Paper	  on	  Defence	  and	  National	  Security,	  «	  the	  current	  rebalancing	  of	  the	  US	  military	  towards	  
the	  Asia-­‐PaciRic	  region	  is	  […]	  an	  important	  factor	  for	  France’s	  commitment	  as	  a	  sovereign	  power	  
and	  a	  player	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  the	  PaciRic	  » .	  	  32This	  statement	  is	  fully	  shared	  by	  the	  EU	  :	  the	  region	  should	  be	  stabilized	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	   risks	   to	   energy	   and	   ressources	   supply,	   but	   also	   to	   achieve	   lasting	   peace,	   security	   and	  justice,	  good	  governance	  based	  on	  the	  democratic	  principles	  of	  inclusion,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights .	  The	  recently	  approved	  EU	  maritime	  security	  strategy ,	  based	  on	  a	  33 34comprehensive	   approach,	   faithfully	   transpose	   these	   two	   dimensions.	   As	   Chairman	   of	   the	  CGPCS,	   the	   EU	   clearly	   afZirms	   its	  will	   to	   assume	   international	   responsibility	   in	   the	   Horn	   of	  Africa.	  The	  EU	  Presidency	  priorities	  have	  been	  rapidly	  deZined	   :	   'Zero/zero',	   (zero	  ships	  and	  zero	  seafarers	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Somali	  pirates)	  ;	  Document	  the	  CGPCS	  Lessons	  Learned	  ;	  ReZine	  
	  Authors’	  footnote	  :	  Interview	  with	  Donna	  Hopkins,	  November	  8,	  201227	  Zach	  D.	  A.,	  Conor	  Seyle	  D.,	  Vestergaard	  Madsen	  J.,	  Burden-­‐sharing	  Multi-­‐level	  governance…,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  2128	  Proutière-­‐Maulion	  G.,	  «	  Les	  enjeux	  de	  la	  sécurisation	  du	  transport	  maritime	  au	  service	  de	  l’action	  extérieure	  de	  29l’Union	  européenne	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  meeting,	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  14	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  EU	  Council,	  Press	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 and	  optimize	  the	  structures	  and	  working	  procedures	  of	  the	  CGPCS	  to	  make	  the	  Contact	  Group	  as	   relevant,	   efZicient	   and	   cost-­‐effective	   as	  possible	   and	   increase	   the	   regional	   involvement	   in	  the	  CGPCS.	  	  The	   very	   creditably	   EU	   objective	   to	   reZine	   and	   optimize	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   CGPCS	   may	  appear	  as	  a	  mere	  formal	  change.	  Some	  other	  measures	  need	  to	  be	  set	  or	  at	  least	  more	  strongly	  addressed	  as	  for	  example	  the	  arrest	  of	  pirate	  instigators/chiefs.	  The	  arrest	  of	  Mohammed	  Abdi	  Hassan	   (AKA	   Afweyneh	   or	   Big	   Mouth)	   should	   give	   incentive	   to	   States	   to	   cooperate	   in	   this	  direction.	  But	   this	  would	   lead	   to	  political	   issues,	   as	   those	   that	   raised	   from	   the	   arrest	   of	   the	  aforementioned	   pirate	   chief.	   This	   latter	   was	   indeed	   traveling	   with	   a	   Somali	   diplomatic	  passport	   and	   involved	   in	   counter-­‐piracy	   activities	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Transitional	   Federal	  Government .	  35Even	  if	  some	  valuable	  UN	  reports	  or	  studies	  suggest	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  piracy	  notably	  by	  building	  and	  strengthen	  the	  prison	  capacity	  of	  the	  regional	  states,	  one	  of	  a	  most	  highly	  priority	  should	   today	   be	   the	   arrest	   of	   pirate	   networks	   leaders.	  «	  This	   requires	   inevitably	   intelligence	  
gathering,	   strategic	  analysis,	  effective	   investigation,	  prosecution	  and	  police	  cooperation	  » .	  To	  36achieve	   this	   objective,	   political	   discussions	   are	   essential	   to	   move	   beyond	   practical	   and	  recurrent	  identiZied	  issues	  (lack	  of	  sufZicient	  evidence	  or	  information	  sharing	  mechanisms	  for	  example) .	   France	   Zinancially	   supports	   regional	   projects	   dedicated	   to	   that	   particular	   issue.	  37From	  the	  INTERPOL	  EVEXI	  (2011-­‐2012)	  and	  EVEXI	  II	  (2013-­‐…)	  projects	  emerges	  a	  series	  of	  standardized	  procedures	   for	   interviewing	  captured	  pirates	  and	  released	  hostages,	  gathering	  legally	   admissible	   physical	   and	   testimonial	   evidence,	   and	   sharing	   of	   intelligence	   to	   support	  existing	  and	   future	   investigations	  and	  prosecutions .	  The	  creation	  of	  a	   special	  unit	   in	  2012	  38and	  of	  a	  regional	  joint	  investigation	  team	  in	  November	  2013 	  constitute	  a	  solid	  framework	  to	  39this	  end ,	  already	   implemented,	   that	   is	  more	   than	  enough	  according	   to	   the	  French	  state.	   In	  40
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  27	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  from	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Monitoring	  Group	  on	  Somalia	  and	  Eritrea	  addressed	  to	  the	  35Chairman	  of	   the	  Security	  Council	  Committee	  pursuant	   to	   resolutions	  751	   (1992)	  and	  1907	  (2009)	  concerning	  Somalia	  and	  Eritrea,	  50,	   [online]	   :	  http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf	   (released	  by	  the	  BBC	  News,	  [online]	  :	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   Interview	  with	   V.	   Roger-­‐Lacan,	   Special	   Representative	   for	   Anti-­‐Maritime	   Piracy,	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	  36France,	  21	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  2014	   Council	   of	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   on	   Crime	   Problems,	   Sea	   Piracy	   (Background	   working	   paper),	  37Strasbourg,	  24	  September	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  cdpc/docs	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  evidence	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  network	  leaders	  »,	  Media	  release,	  21	  38March	  2014	   INTERPOL,	   «	   INTERPOL	   anti-­‐piracy	  meeting	   targets	   network	   leaders	  with	   new	   regional	   Joint	   Investigation	  39Team	  »,	  Media	  release,	  4	  November	  2013	   Gottlieb	   Y.,	   «	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   Maritime	   Piracy:	   Inter-­‐Disciplinary	   Cooperation	   and	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   Sharing	   »,	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 even	  broader	  terms,	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  global	  governance ,	  whose	  one	  of	  the	  41Zirst	  steps	  is	  the	  set-­‐up	  of	  a	  common	  information	  sharing	  for	  effective	  judicial	  procedures.	  
Conclusion	  
As	  a	  highly	  concerned	  state	  by	  the	  piracy	  phenomenon,	  France	  demonstrates	  a	  real	  capacity	  to	  effectively	   contribute	   to	   the	   existing	   mechanisms,	   including	   the	   CGPCS.	   Part	   of	   the	   overall	  system	  of	  Zight	  against	  piracy,	  the	  CGPCS	  offers	  an	  additional	  possibility	  to	  coordinate	  efforts	  for	   states	   that	   desire	   not	   be	   part	   of	   the	   existing	  multinational	   forces.	   As	  member	   of	   those	  forces,	  France	  participates	  actively	  to	  the	  existing	  dedicated	  bodies	  or	  institutions.	  The	  SHADE	  or	   INTERPOL’s	   actions	   comply	  with	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   necessary	   continuum	  between	  operations,	   judicial	   treatment,	   governance,	   security	   and	   development ,	   as	   the	   current	   UN	  42initiatives .	  43Nevertheless,	  the	  Zight	  against	  piracy	  is	  a	  playground,	  where	  both	  national	  and	  international	  interests	  are	  at	  stakes .	  First	  of	  all,	  states	  consider	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  nationals	  as	  a	  duty.	  44Besides	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  nationals,	  it	  does	  exist	  a	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  to	  insure	  an	  
«	  optimum	  public	  order	  of	  the	  oceans	  » ,	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  burdens	  and	  responsibilities.	  	  45The	  study	  of	  the	  current	  counter-­‐piracy	  mechanisms	  shows	  also	  that	  the	  national	  actions	  are	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  sovereign	  will,	  pursuing	  beneZits	  of	  an	   increased	   international	  exposure.	  At	  the	  institutional	  level,	  this	  reveals	  some	  gaps	  to	  be	  Zilled,	  notably	  within	  the	  CGPCS:	  	  	  -­‐ the	  lack	  of	  collaboration	  and	  coordination	  between	  the	  national	  institutions	  of	  the	  regional	  states	  and;	  -­‐ the	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  state	  which	  are	  not	  integrated	  in	  the	  cooperation	  and	  the	  coordination	  of	  the	  naval	  actions.	  
	  Struett	  M.	  J.,	  Carlson	  J.	  D.,	  Nance	  M.	  T.,	  Maritime	  Piracy	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Global	  Governance,	  New	  York	  -­‐	  41London,	  Routledge,	  2013,	  226	  p.	  	  «	  Entretien	  avec	  Jocelyne	  Caballero	  »	  (former	  French	  special	  representative	  for	  the	  international	  coordination	  42of	  the	  Zight	  against	  piracy	  ;	  about	  the	  aforementioned	  UN	  Jack	  Lang’s	  report),	  Partenaires	  Sécurité	  Défense,	  n°	  267,	  Fall	  2011,	  p.	  13	   Proutière-­‐Maulion	   G.,	   Lecture	   on	  Multilateral	   diplomacy	   and	   cooperation	   between	   USA,	   Russia	   and	   EU	   :	   the	  43
example	   of	   the	   Right	   against	   piracy,	   Annual	   Conference	   on	   Cultural	   Diplomacy,	   Berlin,	   2013	   :	   «	   Under	   the	  
leadership	   of	   the	   UN	   Political	   OfRice	   for	   Somalia	   (UNPOS),	   the	   UN	   OfRice	   of	   Drugs	   and	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  (dir.),	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  recherche	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  2010,	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 For	  France,	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  Commission	  (IOC)	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  body	  to	  enhance	  the	  participation	  of	  regional	  states.	  It	  «	  has	  continuously	  put	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  enhancement	  
of	  regional	  cooperation	  particularly	  at	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  for	  dealing	  with	  
various	  maritime	  threats	  in	  the	  region	  » .	  IOC	  is	  now	  co-­‐chairing	  the	  CGPCS	  Working	  Group	  1	  46on	   Capacity	   Building.	   Its	   expertise	   and	   previous	   actions	   would	   be	   of	   a	   signiZicant	   interest	  especially	   for	   preparation	   of	   the	   much-­‐anticipated	   paper	   on	   key	   priorities	   and	   capabilities	  (end	  of	  2016),	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  Somalisation	  of	  the	  solutions.	  Finally	   it	  seems	  necessary	  to	  highlight	  the	  necessity	  to	  refocus	  the	  current	  means	  to	  combat	  maritime	  piracy	  and	  promote	  a	  preventive	  way.	  «	  In	  a	  really	  near	  future,	  the	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  
the	  search	  and	  prosecution	  of	  pirate	  networks	  leaders	  » ,	  which	  is	  the	  fundamental	  basis	  to	  the	  47continued	  search	   for	  a	   lasting	  solution	   to	  a	  phenomenon	   that	  endangered	  national,	   regional	  and	  international	  security.	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